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BRUSSELS, April 29 (Reuters) – European Union foreign ministers agreed on Tuesday to keep sanctions on Uzbekistan suspended for another six months, but warned they could be reapplied if human rights conditions do not improve.
EU foreign ministers meeting in Luxembourg said they remained seriously concerned about the rights situation in Uzbekistan, but they welcomed progress, including abolition of the death penalty and the release of some rights activists.
“With a view to encouraging the Uzbek authorities to take substantive steps to improve the human rights situation and taking into account their commitments, the Council decided that visa restrictions for individuals … would not apply for another period of six months,” their statement said.
“After three months, the Council will review the progress made by the Uzbek authorities,” it added.
“The Council will closely and continuously monitor and assess … the human rights situation in Uzbekistan and may lift, amend or reapply the visa restrictions as appropriate.”
The EU imposed visa bans on senior Uzbek officials after witnesses said troops killed hundreds of people, including women and children, when they opened fire on unarmed protesters in the town of Andizhan in May 2005.
Germany led a push to drop the sanctions. Last October EU foreign ministers agreed to suspend them for six months, while warning they would be automatically reapplied if there was not progress on human rights and democracy.
Analysts say Germany is keen to protect its interests in Uzbekistan, including a military base used to supply its troops stationed in Afghanistan as part of a NATO mission there.
Those still on the suspended visa ban list are Defence Minister Ruslan Mirzayev and seven others including National Security chief Rustam Inoyatov.
Rights groups had called on the EU not to allow the sanctions to lapse as they are due to in October without ensuring more progress.
They say that while there have been some improvements, serious rights issues remain and Uzbekistan still has not ensured accountability for Andizhan—the main reason the sanctions were imposed in the first place.
Uzbekistan says 187 people, all guerrillas or “terrorists”, were killed in a police action against Islamist extremists in the town.
SOURCE:Reuters
April 30th, 2008
Today it is obvious that security issues in the broad and narrow sense will be in the limelight, just like geopolitics in general, even though as few as 20 years ago it was suggested the term “geopolitics” be discarded as obsolete. Today no one contends the correlation between security issues and geopolitics. It is in this vein that the article is written. It will raise some points, which are being discussed as to Uzbekistan’s stance.
General remarks.
Complex and specific situation in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the new independent states in the regions have exerted their impact on internal and external policies of the nascent Republic of Uzbekistan. It has to be reminded that this period is marked by many discrepancies and controversies at the national level in the new independent states of Central Asia, as well as in the inter-state relations, followed by a civil war in Tajikistan, open-ended conflict in Afghanistan, new frictions in the relations among the New Independent States of Central Asia related to the state borders, water and energy issues. Moreover, the Republic of Uzbekistan is the most densely populated state in the region and is adjacent to the zones of the existing or potential conflicts. Besides, new state institutions had to be formed and the priorities for economic and social reforms had to be set.
This situation largely accounted for Uzbekistan’s strategic development priorities based on the fundamental responsibility on the part of the Uzbek leadership for Uzbekistan’s future and for the whole region. In essence, Tashkent proceeds from the assumption that Uzbekistan plays a stabilisation role in the region due to its geographical location, natural and human resources and historical experience. This approach was obviously treated cautiously by some external forces. However, there are no doubts that the above principle of Uzbekistan’s accountability will remain preponderant in the mid-term and provide an insight into the logic of the national leadership’s strategy.
Security issues
In fact, this logic in the decision-making processes has not so far undergone any essential changes. In particular, it can be seen at the level of elaborating conceptual approaches to the security issues. For instance:
1. Uzbekistan earlier than many other states raised the issue of the international terrorist threat and religious extremism. Suffice it to recall, at the 48-th session of the UN General Assembly back in 1993 the leitmotiv of the speech made by Uzbekistan’s president Islom Karimov was to unite efforts in fighting the global threat of international terrorism and religious radicalism. At that time this call was not given due attention and the situation changed dramatically after the 11 September 2001 tragedy in New York.
Tashkent has always been consistent in evaluating security threats, in this particular case, those posed by terrorism. A complex situation in Afghanistan can be cited after the Taliban moved to the CIS southern borders in 1996. At that time some Uzbekistan’s neighbours decided against dramatizing the situation and were even ready to establish relations with the Taliban movement.
After a series of terrorist attacks in Tashkent in 1999 Uzbekistan’s leadership found itself in a difficult situation, all the more so that Uzbekistan’s Islamic movement was unambiguous in its aggressiveness and was getting increasingly closer to the international terrorist structures, such as Al-Qaeda. In this situation, along with the insufficient attention of the international community to a real threat, which dramatically revealed itself in a year and a half, Uzbekistan specified an action strategy in case the situation deteriorates. Substantial changes were made in the National Security Concept. Military Doctrine was replaced altogether by the Defence Doctrine.
It is no wonder that after the USA waged a war on terror Uzbekistan engaged into this campaign and, more specifically, provided its military air force base in Khanabad to the USA on a temporary basis. Even today Uzbekistan does not underestimate a terrorist threat and is ready to participate in collective international counter-terrorist activities. In particular, it provides its assistance to NATO, namely to the Federal Republic of Germany, so that it could accomplish tasks in its zone of responsibility in Afghanistan.
(2). Among other real threats, which Uzbekistan has consistently recognized, is drug trafficking, drug production in Afghanistan and drug transportation via Central Asian states.
(3). Another permanent regional threat is the complicated situation in Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, the situation in this country is far from becoming stable. Weak central power in Kabul, persistent fratricide wars, ethnical and clan conflicts among the Afghans, complete dependency of a significant part of the population on drug production constitute a non-exhaustive list of problems, which neither the USA, nor NATO are capable of solving, all the more so given the US fiasco in Iraq.
The issue of Afghanistan is of serious concern to Uzbekistan not only due to the geographical proximity with this fractured country, but also for other reasons. Some argue that one of the US mistakes is to impose artificial democratic regimes in Afghanistan according to the Western standards. Today it is of no use to impose abstract democracy models on the Afghans when most of the population does not get what they should do. Often the same mistakes are made as during the Soviet military presence, which results in rejecting the West with its values, religion and culture. In some regions people are even nostalgic about Russia, even the former contestants of Moscow.
However, despite obvious circumstances, no active efforts are seemingly pursued in the West to find a working concept of reforming the Afghan state with due regard for its traditions, mentality and other factors.
Against this background some US experts think it is too early to talk about the Big Central Asia (which means considering Afghanistan together with the Central Asian New Independent States). Extending the number of Central Asian countries (not geographically) will dramatically complicate the already motley regional composition. Creating institutions of regional integration is far from being over. Therefore, an untimely extension of the number of its participants will not only complicate the situation, but may also undermine some promising projects and result in unnecessary political problems.
Countering security threats
Uzbekistan is deeply convinced that none of the Central Asian countries or any of the major external partners is capable of countering the abovementioned threats on their own. It has to be noted that all regional politicians and experts are calling upon fostering cooperation, apart from Turkmenistan that has a different stance. However, the main question for the countries lies in choosing priority areas for such cooperation and in the way they evaluate efficiency of their interaction as to countering security threats.
Thanks to the measures taken, including those at the level international law, potential cooperation pattern is being shaped. Among its participants are the New Independent States, except China. In this respect, the following comments can be made.
CIS. Unfortunately, the hopes pinned on the CIS as the driving force behind the post-Soviet states integration turned out to be unjustified. CIS is turning into a club for political discussion and today is incapable of taking efficient collective measures in all areas of cooperation. However, CIS as a special international tool has not yet lost its raison d’etre. It provides an opportunity for its members to make their stance heard, as well as constitutes a tool for finding partners and cooperation forms on a bilateral basis or within the framework of other organizations, where CIS states are also members.
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The Organisation openly demonstrates its ambitions, especially China, and is quite promising given the emerging geopolitical pattern. However, although the SCO formed its institutions, it does not mean that all the SCO members share the same approach as to the organisation’s future priorities. Apart from ostentatious military trainings, held mostly by Russia and China, the SCO has so far done little as an organisation countering terrorism, drug trafficking and other threats.
Despite creating a Regional antiterrorist structure within the framework of the SCO, its activities bear few results. Apparently, at this stage its activities should be focused on information exchange concerning the leaders and members of the terrorist and separatist groups and international drug cartels. However, even in this area the SCO is facing some technical issues and diverging members’ objectives and tasks.
EuroAsian Economic Community. It is a relatively new and promising organisation, though dominated by economic cooperation issues. Efficient and timely solution of these issues may be positive in terms of palliating social and economic issues at the national level in a given country, which may be conducive to reinforcing internal security and stability.
Collective Security Treaty Organization. This organisation is functionally oriented towards ensuring security. However, many organisational and management issues are complicated by a vast geographical representation of its members, as well as differences in approaches as to what security threats should be recognized as the most important.
Uzbekistan’s stance.
The first experience, which does not always turn out to be the most successful, of creating the abovementioned organisations is the main reason why Uzbekistan’s leadership in its cooperation with external partners favours bilateral ties. It is in accordance with Uzbekistan’s law “On External Policy”, which says that Uzbekistan will not be a member of any military or political bloc or alliance.
This principle has nothing to do with the principle of neutrality in Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan is a member of some organisations, including those that were mentioned. It has to be noted that all these organisations are not classical military and political alliances, such as NATO or the former Warsaw Pact.
This explains suspension of Uzbekistan’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation in 1992 upon Uzbekistan’s initiative, which was due to the growing concern about the worsening situation in Afghanistan after withdrawal of the Soviet troops. After the administration of VladimirPutin came to power it was increasingly clear that there would not be any efforts to make the Collective Security Treaty Organisation a future basis for changing military and political configuration in the CIS. Uzbekistan became its member again. The Senate ratified this decision in March 2008.
Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from GUUAM is due to the same reasons, when this organisation was increasingly seen as a political counterbalance to Russia’s growing political powers. Uzbekistan’s hopes to get economic benefit from its membership were not justified. All these resulted in Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from GUUAM.
It has to be taken into account that Uzbekistan considers its participation in the international organizations on the post-Soviet territory as an opportunity to enhance mutually beneficial cooperation on a bilateral basis and find new avenues of cooperation. Unfortunately, as it turned out, even a narrow circle (3-4 countries) of the participants in the promising projects in CIS is not working efficiently enough. Therefore, bilateral treaties are more operational, productive and controllable, whereas attempts to find solutions within a broader framework turn into a talking shop.
From this point, Uzbekistan’s developing relations with Russia provide a good example. As it is known, under Boris Yeltsin the relations between the countries were limited to declarations of good intentions and even characterized by mutual reproaches. Time was lost and some opportunities were missed. Today the situation is drastically changing. In accordance with the agreements, the bilateral Russian-Uzbek relations acquired the status of not only partnership relations, but became inter-allied.
There are grounds to believe that this state of affairs satisfies both parties. The matter is that national security issues, including mutual assistance guarantees in Uzbekistan, depend to a large extent on Russia. This situation reflects shared opinion of Uzbekistan’s leadership and the overwhelming majority of the population.
Against the background of Uzbekistan’s relations with some of its neighbours, which are not always smooth, Uzbekistan does not see any possibility of close bilateral cooperation with them in the military and technical areas, all the more so that their potential does not respond to its needs. Therefore, in terms of ensuring military capabilities of its military forces Uzbekistan banks on Russia, which means armaments and technologies supplies, as well as cooperation in training personnel.
Close and productive cooperation between Uzbekistan and Russia (far exceeding that with any other state) stands the testimony to it. It can be suggested that such situation will remain in the mid-term if Russia’s management keep sticking to its stance on Uzbekistan.
Despite the obvious priority to Russia, Tashkent is trying to diversify its cooperation with other states. One of the most successful examples of such cooperation is with the Federal Republic of Germany. Its military forces may use a southern Uzbek town of Termez and its infrastructure as a transfer point for their military men serving in Afghanistan. Tellingly, such relations do not provoke any discontent with other countries, all the more so that military and political cooperation between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Federal Republic of Germany is backed up by a reciprocal desire to develop trade and economic ties, including ways of implementing German investment programs.
Cooperation between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the USA is especially acute because its military and political aspects were given a great impetus at the beginning of the counter-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan hoped that after toppling the Taliban the USA will bring order and stability to Afghanistan. It did nit happen. For the USA it was extremely beneficial to use the Uzbek base in Khanabad to solve their tasks in Afghanistan. However, it was getting clear that Washington was going to take advantage of its military presence in Uzbekistan with long-term geopolitical implications.
On the whole, the USA made some obvious mistakes. Among them are: (1). Washington did not get Uzbekistan’s discontent about unrealised hopes of massive material and financial aid from the USA. (2). Washington overestimated the regional countries’ dependence on the US political will. The US authoritative style gave rise to explicit and implicit discontent. (3). The war in Iraq exerted a negative impact on the American image. The USA were trying to convince Uzbekistan to take part in it. (4). The USA underestimated the fact that the relations between Uzbekistan and Russia had not only been forgotten, but were needed by both parties and called for their modernisation.
For these reasons a “honeymoon” in the relations between Uzbekistan and the USA ended as quickly as it began. The USA were asked to leave the Uzbek air force base. The USA then turned to their rhetoric accusing Uzbekistan of not-existent democracy and human rights. The events in Andijan were a good chance for the US to turn the EU and NATO against Uzbekistan. Germany did not agree with it. However, even as the country assuming the EU presidency Germany was among the minority.
This resulted in colder bilateral relations. No one won and no one lost. There are some indications that make us conclude that the ambiguity of such situation no longer satisfies the USA, who lost in Uzbekistan a trustworthy partner. In the last 6 months the USA have been taking careful steps to bring relations with Uzbekistan to a new level. In any case, a quick visit by the US Air Forces Central Committee Chief to Tashkent stands a proof to this. Initial measures have already been taken by both parties. For example, Uzbekistan provided its air corridor for supplying cargos to Afghanistan, exclusively humanitarian cargo and only by the German air forces. However, it would be premature to speak about restoring military and political cooperation with the USA in their former format.
The threat to become a victim of geopolitical games or to lose some part of its sovereignty and independence, which Uzbekistan will never accept, accounts for this.
Along with external factors regional problems should not be discarded. They constitute a challenge rather than a threat. First and foremost, it concerns rational use of water and energy resources. Border issues and similar issues are of secondary importance from this perspective.
Among the internal national issues one can point out those, which any country faces: social differences, persistence of clan structures and regionalism, poverty, limited resources for implementing large-scale projects (searching external investors), religious factors (radicalism).
All social and economic issues may be gradually solved at the national level, increasing the number of external investors is mostly a matter of time, but extremism, especially religious extremism, may require rapid military intervention. The events in Andidjan are a good example to this. The government severely clamped down upon a military coup organized by the Islamic radicals, drug dealers and criminals.
Bearing in mind the numerous victims, it has to be recognized that most part of the population is increasingly aware of the implications the events in Andijan could have produced not only in Uzbekistan, if the riots had not been quashed.
Tellingly, such pressure on terrorists in order to normalise the situation was understood by many countries, including Russia, which also accounts for the even closer relations between our countries.
Ideology of Partnership
A popular idea about the necessity of a multi-vectored policy as the basis for the ideology of partnership does not seem to be the overriding, although important.
Multi-vectored policy is being elaborated either in the official cabinets and analytical centers working for them, or reveals itself in a chaotic way as a reaction to the changing situation and the external forces’ actions that go along with it. Apparently, big self-sufficient states and political blocs, determining major regional and global development trends, can choose the first option.
Other less influential members of international community do not have such an opportunity, mostly due to the scarcity of their national resources. However, many of them more and more often resort to elaborating their ideology of partnership with their own vision of a multi-vectored policy. In reality this is just a cover-up of a chaotic external policy in a rapidly evolving environment. Some small Central Asian countries do this.
Uzbekistan has so far refused to adopt such an approach. If the term “multi-vectored policy” was used at all, it was with a different meaning, in particular, with reference to setting tasks in accordance with the principle of priority and precedence. In general Uzbekistan’s ideology of partnership is based on the following principles:
Firstly, on the choice of a partner, the extent of partnership and major avenues of partnership, which depend on the national interests. This requires a right approach in finding common interests with the potential partners.
Secondly, on defining topical national issues and similar issues with other states, which would require cooperation with external partners. Obviously, it can mean one or several partners, what can be qualified as a multi-vectored approach. However, it is not quite so because in this case we are speaking about an ad-hoc partnership.
Thirdly, on the multi-layered approach in choosing a partner. In reality sustainable partnership in one area may go hand in hand with the differences in other areas.
Undoubtedly, the partnership based on the above principles is not always long-term and can be considered with scepticism and criticism. The crux of this approach is not “partnership for the sake of partnership”, but a partnership for attaining a certain goal at a given stage and at a given period of time. This approach sheds more light on Uzbekistan’s ideology of partnership and provides an insight into the logic of those activities, which were taken earlier and are being taken.
One can often hear comments on the vectors of Uzbekistan’s policy, which are linked with the geographical scope of Uzbekistan’s leader’s visits and their frequency. However, this approach is not quite correct. The visits to Russia and Turkey, the EU countries and Japan, China and Malaysia, South Korea and the Arab states do not mean there is some complicated multi-vectored policy. In reality it might mean finding partners to accomplish a certain task. Uzbekistan, like other states in the region, is still acquiring experience in developing relations with its non-traditional partners. 16 years of independence are seemingly not enough for this.
This situation influences the idea of forming a regional partnership structure, which is today far from being an easy matter. There are significant differences in the countries’ stance on most issues of regional importance. At the same time no one denies that such problems exist, but their causes and solutions are seen differently. All this is based on the reference to the national interests and a growing national identity. In the long run, everyone agrees that integration processes should be stimulated. They are regarded by many as some unifying processes.
There is a prevailing opinion in Uzbekistan that at this stage integration should be seen as an interaction tool to solve specific problems. Choosing this option will pave the way for the new forms of integration.
However, many initiatives and related multilateral projects were “stillborn” mostly due to the notorious issue of multi-vectored policy, which is pursued in some neighbouring Republics. In reality the newly independent states of Central Asia, on their own or having combined their efforts, are not capable of implementing multilateral mutually beneficial projects in any area as the basis of integration.
In this regard, the attempts to create a Central Asian Economic Community were not totally justified, as well as forming within its framework a Central Asian Central Bank, water, energy and other consortiums, ensuring free reciprocal access to the media and other information sources.
Given the still existent practices of traditional solutions of the present-day issues by short-term bilateral agreements, the same question arises: is the regional integration needed at all, even as the joint implementation of multilateral projects?
Uzbekistan thinks it is necessary, but as a gradual implementation of specific “civilization” projects. The international conference on the Aral sea, which took place in Tashkent in March, 2008, proves this. Obviously, the subject put forward by Uzbekistan was topical and politically correct. However, there was no avoiding some political implications. The range of different ranks of representatives, who participated in the conference, proves this.
This recent example, like many others, has shown vividly the necessity to have somebody who would spearhead integration processes in the region. Only Russia seems to be capable of assuming this role today.
To prove this one can cite examples of a successful cooperation under the Russian “umbrella”. In particular, in the military sphere head-quarter exercises are getting more frequent with the participation of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
An association of gas producing countries comprising Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which with Gazprom’s support can get important dividends by extending gas supplies to the world markets, has been created.
In any case, such projects may create a solid basis for multilateral cooperation in its real form, but not on paper. It seems that such partnership concept is of increasing interest with these potential leaders, such as the USA or Japan, for implementing specific regional projects. This avenue of regional cooperation and partnership looks promising.
Having said this, a broader interpretation of the term “alternative” can be proposed. Undoubtedly, there are many examples when the priority is given exclusively to one external partner does not have any other alternative (mutual exclusion). The acquired, although still insignificant, experience makes it possible to consider alternative complementary with due account of the proposed principles and approaches.
For instance, Uzbekistan’s obvious orientation to Russia as regards exploration, production and transportation of hydrocarbons does not rule out the participation of China, Japan and South Korea in these processes. The companies of these countries should not pursue driving Russia out of Kazakhstan, but they have real investment opportunities in Uzbekistan. In this case alternative seen as complementarity is beneficial to everyone.
In any case the entire set of issues linked with the ideology of partnership will still be discussed for a long time, which will pave the way for a broad and multi-faceted concept on this issue. It does not yet exist in its complete format in many countries, which leads to mistakes in choosing a partner.
Social and political aspects
When analyzing a country’s external posture social and political aspects are often linked with the stance of the national elite representatives or groups. National elite in its traditional sense is still being formed in Uzbekistan. What is called political, business and intellectual elite in Uzbekistan is represented rather by individual authorities, who have a chance to exert a certain influence on public opinion and to a lesser extent on the powers that be.
In Uzbekistan there are traditionally several famous families (dynasties), who are respected and enjoy great authority. However, it does not always mean that they are part of what is usually called elite. In public opinion elitism is seen as the leaders’ proximity to politics, economics and well-known intellectuals.
This elitism is multi-layered and very often temporary. In politics it comes from the President’s entourage to the leaders of local administration (khokim). In economy it starts from the successful businessmen and state officials and goes to bazarcom (head of a big market). In an intellectual sphere it goes from famous scientists, artists and state officials to the heads of departments in a provincial university.
Despite their positions, these elites have a limited scope of influence. While the presidential powers are strong, one can hardly speak about sustainable elite groups in Uzbekistan with their old traditions, to say nothing of the possibility to exert decisive influence on the decision-making. The elites are well aware that their time may be soon up and their touted elitism will be restricted to a certain street or machali (traditionally organized citizens of the same district), although it will be looked up to by the relatives. The principle according to which “when you have at least some authority and finances, you are respected, when you lose it, you are forgotten” is the main explanation why there are no lasting elites in Uzbekistan.
Therefore, if a group pretends to be an elite, it will stress its loyalty to the state leadership, which, in fact, determines a national elite. However, the elites, even temporary ones, pursue their own interests and are trying to show their loyalty at their elitist level. More successful they are in doing this, higher they get in their elitist hierarchy, which paves the way for extending their own interests and ways of achieving them.
The elites’ interests are, as a rule, personally motivated. It is not always a pecuniary interest, though it prevails in all the New Independent States of Central Asia. Getting into the elite is often triggered by ambitiousness and vanity and does not always mean an intention to make a contribution to ensuring national and social interests.
In this situation the elites are looking for internal partners not only among then or at their level, but also elsewhere. It constitutes the basis for forming groups in accordance with the corporate interests. Uzbekistan’s leadership is well aware of the situation. For example, a young Liberal-Democratic party of Uzbekistan supported by the President I.Karimov and holding leading positions in the legislative system, is called upon to consolidate these growing corporate interests within the framework of the national interests. In this way two objectives are achieved: (1) limiting the influence of the clans, family and local groups and (2) stimulating and developing a completely new elite in Uzbekistan on this basis. This is a credible task, but quite challenging, which will require some time to form new thinking patterns and traditions, especially among the young.
At the same time the elite groups do not limit themselves to looking for internal partners. Many of them are pro-active externally in pursuing their interests, which are quite different in their structure, nature and ways of achieving among the groups.
If the elites strive to firmly stick to the tenets of Uzbekistan’s leadership, which deprives them of their own initiative and creativity, business elites are more independent and have more opportunities, but they are running higher risks in developing external partnerships.
In doing so there are often visible differences in the interests of political and business structures. However, everyone is acting properly to ensure their interests. For example, when the relations between Russia and Uzbekistan were quite cold under B.Eltsin, the Uzbek businesses not only kept maintaining their relations with their Russian counterparts, but were trying to find new opportunities. The same applies to the current relations between Uzbekistan and Great Britain. Conversely, against the backdrop of the then favourable relations between Uzbekistan and the USA, there is a growing scandal around the gold producing company Newmont. There are many examples of this kind. However, political and business elites are trying to at least prevent their interests from dramatic overlapping, if not consolidate them.
Structures of influence on Uzbekistan’s internal and external policy are quite vague and under-developed. For example, lobbyism, which is popular in the West, does not have its roots and traditions in Uzbekistan. This does not mean that there are no attempts to exert some influence on the authorities by business elites. However, they tend to take traditional forms (family relations, friends, presents and bribes, which gives rise to corruption). As a rule, national interests are not taken into account. As to these actions as such, they pursue specific and obvious subjective goals.
The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is also weak. Like any other civil society institutions, they are still in the making. Uzbekistan, like other New Independent States after the collapse of the USSR, faced the problem when using external financial resources by NGOs made them tools in the hands of external actors to be used for pressuring Uzbekistan, including for organizing one more “colour” revolution. Uzbekistan’s rigid stance and counteraction to such intentions were used by some Western circles to fan anti-Uzbek feelings. The situation with NGOs in Uzbekistan is evolving quite slowly. When there used to be a solid financial support from abroad for the NGOs, their number was growing and young dynamic people were attracted to work for them. Today usually disinterested enthusiasts with solid experience in forming civil society work there.
Uzbekistan has a legal and normative base regulating NGOs activities, their rights and scope. However, there is seemingly a growing need to modernize the rules of material and financial support for NGOs. In this case more efficient NGOs will emerge, which will not position themselves as grumbling freethinkers (which is not promising today), but as the partners to the state and thus influence internal and external policies.
Social aspect is extremely important in developing partnership, especially with Russia. According to many public opinion polls, people are convinced that friendly relations should be maintained with all countries, but first and foremost with Russia (on average 70% of the population).
Such approach has been recently buttressed by an increasingly popular issue of labour migration. Given that there is a surplus of labour resources in Uzbekistan, many Uzbeks, especially those who are poorly qualified, consider Russia a certain Klondike.
However, Russian-Uzbek relations should not be limited to searching job opportunities by the Uzbeks in Russia. It would be incorrect and not objective. Without any doubts Russia and Uzbekistan have close historical, traditional and developed humane relations. Suffice it to say, Russia is an absolute leader when it turns to informational and cultural coverage in Uzbekistan.
One more trend has to be noted. There is phased national educational programme in Uzbekistan, which is extremely important for the Republic because more than half of its population are people younger than 20. At the same time in late 90-s well-off families tried to send their children to study in the prestigious Western universities. This trend is still valid today, but there is also a growing tendency to get education in the leading Russian universities. Apparently, in the near future this will only be more favoured.
Partnership relations with and without Russia
When the question is raised in this way, alternative is considered in terms of mutual exclusion. Globalisation makes such approach highly unlikely even for the world centers of power or given countries, whose leaders overestimate their importance, which might result in their partial or complete isolation.
Such approach is unacceptable to Uzbekistan. Due to the above reasons Uzbekistan currently sees one of its external policies priorities in Russia, which is in keeping with the spirit of the established inter-allied relations between the two states. However, Uzbekistan is not ambiguous about the fact that it intends to develop relations up to the partnership level with any states which might be interested in this. Moreover, it maintains dialogue with the states, whose leaders are, to put it mildly, not quite loyal to the Republic of Uzbekistan. Cooperation opportunities with many states are being looked into in various areas.
In this regard the most plausible mid-term scenario of developing partnership relations on the part of Uzbekistan is as follows:
1. The general strategy as well as the principles of external political and economic activities will not undergo any essential changes.
2. The priority will be given to relations with Russia, provided its new leadership will keep to its strategy based on absolute reciprocal equality. Russia’s dominance in Uzbekistan and in the region on the whole boils down to several objective reasons, such as dynamic cooperation in the military and political spheres, as well as in the economic sectors, which are vital to the Republic of Uzbekistan. This cooperation is reinforced by tight humanitarian relations. It is highly unlikely that the situation will change in the mid-term.
3. Russia’s presence does not hinder the development of complementary areas of cooperation and making new partners to implement bilateral and multilateral economic projects. Furthermore, these processes are already under way without any detriment to the Russian-Uzbek relations.
4. Finally, one should hardly expect that in the mid-term a country from the region can become a leader in Central Asia. It is not that there are no aspirants, but other states may not agree with it.
To cap it all, the proposed scenario can turn out to be likely if the partners will be building their relations on the principles of tolerance, moderation and balances interests.
RAFIC SAIFULIN,
political analyst, Uzbekistan
SOURCE:EURASIAN HOME
April 27th, 2008
President of Uzbekistan signed the law “On ratification of the Minimum Age Convention” (Geneva, June 26, 1973), his press service reported.
The lower house of the parliament of the Oly Majlis adopted the law on March 13 and the upper house on March 27, 2008.
Article 1 of the Convention states, “Every member [of the International Labor Organization] for which this Convention is in force undertakes to pursue a national policy designed to ensure the effective abolition of child labor and to raise progressively the minimum age for admission to employment or work to a level consistent with the fullest physical and mental development of young persons.”
Article 2 (Paragraph 3) states that “The minimum age specified in pursuance of Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling and, in any case, shall not be less than 15 years.” All the same, “Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 3 of this Article, a Member whose economy and educational facilities are insufficiently developed may, after consultations with organizations of employers and workers concerned, where such exist, initially specify a minimum age of 14 years.”
Article 7 states that “National laws or regulations may permit the employment or work of persons 13 to 15 years of age on light work which is –
(a) not likely to be harmful to their health or development; and
(b) not such as to prejudice their attendance at school, their participation in vocational orientation or training programmes approved by the competent authority or their capacity to benefit from the instruction received.”
“The minimum age for admission to any type of employment or work which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out is likely to jeopardize the health, safety, or morals of young persons shall not be less than 18 years.” (Article 3, Paragraph 1)
Uzbekistan is regularly blamed for child labor, particularly in cotton plantations. The authorities keep insisting that no children are used in cotton fields. Some European countries refuse to deal Uzbek cotton despite Tashkent’s denials.
April 8th, 2008
“The United States does not have military bases in Uzbekistan and neither has it applied for their establishment in this country,” Ambassador Richard Norland said. “This issue was not on the agenda of Admiral Fallon’s visit to Tashkent this January. It is not on the agenda of the US Administration at this point. Some Americans attached to NATO or ISAF with the UN mandate have been permitted to use the German air bridge on their way to Afghanistan via Termez since January 31 but a special permit is issued in every particular episode.”
(Note that the diplomat is no longer speaking of the American advisor to the German general he previously mentioned. He talks of the Americans.)
The US diplomat mentioned the so called “progress in the human rights sphere” that allowed for certain improvement of the American-Uzbek relations.
“Promotion of human rights remains an important component of our policy with regard to Uzbekistan,” Norland said. “The Uzbek leadership made some important steps in this sphere this year and released some political prisoners [five prisoners – Ferghana.Ru]. Even more importantly, it permitted the International Red Cross to visit penitentiary establishments again. It is encouraging. We keep urging the government of Uzbekistan to take additional measures in this sphere. We are convinced that involvement of the Uzbek government in discussion of the issues on the agenda (regional security, trade, investments, cultural exchange, and human rights) is of paramount importance. It is clear that international community’s interest in and cooperation with the Uzbek authorities are better from the standpoint of positive changes than calls for isolation.”
Norland said Pamela Spratlen, acting US Undersecretary of State for South and Central Asia, is coming to Uzbekistan for negotiations with the Uzbek government later today. (Spratlen has already visited Kyrgyzstan.) Agenda of the talks will be traditional and include regional security, Afghanistan, trade, investments, cultural exchange, human rights, humanitarian contacts.
Asked about the state of affairs with the English language, Norland proclaimed it quite promising. “Language is more than an instrument of communication. It is a bridge. The Russian language is another important bridge in this region…” he said.
The American ambassador hopes that ACCELS and IREX, the organization expelled from Uzbekistan on a clearly invented excuse, will be permitted to return to this Central Asian country. (Practically all foreign non-governmental organizations were driven out of Uzbekistan in 2006.)
“As for investments, they are quite important for any economy,” Norland said. “Foreign investments are needed to make economy the leading force. American investors are always on a lookout for the regions where they may make profit. General Motors is expanding into Uzbekistan [it set up a joint venture with the Uzbeks – Ferghana.Ru news agency]. It means that General Motors expects to make money here. Some US businesses, however, are disturbed by existence of certain barriers and problems with hard currency conversion are one of them. Still, General Motors’ expansion into Uzbekistan shows that it has faith. I hope it will succeed and become the first of many US investors…”
“Our relations are improving,” Norland said. “Certain progress is undeniable. We are convinced that involvement of the Uzbek government into a dialogue will be even more productive.”
28.03.2008
Ferghana Ru
Omar Sharifov
SOURCE:Turkish Weekly
March 30th, 2008
Silence on Armenia
By Levon Ter-Petrossian
Wednesday, March 5, 2008; A21
YEREVAN, Armenia—In Armenia’s presidential election last month, I stood as the main opposition candidate against incumbent Prime Minister Serzh Sarkissian. The election followed a sadly familiar script: The regime harassed the opposition’s representatives, bribed and intimidated voters, stuffed ballot boxes, and systematically miscounted votes. Indeed, the rigging of the outcome did not begin on Feb. 19. For the duration of the campaign the country’s main medium of communication, television, which is tightly controlled by the regime, churned out propaganda that would have made Brezhnev-era Soviet propagandists blush in shame.
We in the opposition were angered by all of this but not surprised. What surprised and dismayed us was the deafening silence from the West. What dismayed us even more was the technical report of the observer mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which rubber-stamped Sarkissian’s farcical claim of victory.
The people of Armenia, unlike the OSCE monitors, chose to see what happened at the polling stations. Naturally, they discounted Sarkissian’s claim and gathered to demand annulment of the results. They staged a continuous protest at Opera Square that became the most wonderful celebration of freedom and one that should be studied as an example of nonviolent, lawful resistance against illegitimate rule.
Deeply concerned that the ranks of protesters were swelling by the day, the regime decided early Saturday to resort to force. Riot police were ordered to disperse the crowd, detain the opposition leaders and put me under house arrest. After several hours, citizens reassembled at another site, demanding to see their leaders, but instead they encountered more riot police, later reinforced by units of the Armenian army, which was ordered to crush the protest. At least eight people were killed this weekend, and emergency rule has been declared.
How did we come to this? Why did the regime headed by outgoing President Robert Kocharian and “president-elect” Sarkissian think it could get away with using force against its own people? Surely the two men had their reasons, but the West’s signal, even if unintentional, that they did not have to worry about a strong international reaction was the most important one.
We in Armenia have been trying to understand the roots of such indifference to the rape of our democracy by the Kocharian-Sarkissian regime. The available evidence suggests two explanations: First, some influential organizations and actors in the West, and in Europe in particular, are naively wedded to the notion of positive reinforcement. They seem to think that praising small improvements, instead of criticizing major flaws, creates an incentive for good behavior. Anyone who has studied this regime closely, however, understands the absurdity of such an approach.
Second, and perhaps more important, is the oft-stated claim that the only people able to settle Armenia’s long-standing conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region will be leaders who are themselves from Nagorno-Karabakh—as Kocharian and Sarkissian are—and who are perceived domestically as hard-liners. This is analogous to the “only Nixon could go to China” logic. The problem is that despite being in power for the past 10 years, Kocharian and Sarkissian have done little to move the negotiating process forward. More important, any leader who must make consequential and difficult choices must have the trust of his people. Sarkissian does not have that trust. After what he and Kocharian did on March 1, he will not be able to govern here, let alone make difficult choices.
So what should be done? What do the people of Armenia expect from the West, and the United States in particular? At the very least, we expect a strong and unequivocal condemnation of the violence that occurred March 1 and a recognition that the government, not the opposition, bears responsibility. This condemnation should accompany a stern warning against continued persecution of the opposition and its leaders—mistreatment that is reaching unprecedented levels—as well as a demand to lift the restrictions on the media and restore the people’s rights to free assembly and unbiased information. We also expect a reassessment of the conduct of the election. Any serious reassessment will inevitably lead to the conclusion that a new election must be held.
If these steps are not taken, Armenians will draw two very undesirable conclusions: that peaceful and lawful means of political struggle are ineffective and pointless, and that the West cares about democracy only when it is politically expedient to do so. The West must do everything possible to dissuade Armenia’s citizens from reaching those conclusions.
The writer was president of Armenia from 1991 to 1998 and was the main opposition candidate for president this year. He is under house arrest.
SOURCE:The Washington Post
March 5th, 2008
Молчание вокруг Армении (“The Washington Post”, США)
Мы, армяне, сейчас пытаемся осмыслить, в чем корни безразличия к насилию над нашей демократией
Левон Тер-Петросян (Levon Ter-Petrossian), 05 марта 2008
На президентских выборах, проходивших в Армении в прошлом месяце, я выступал в качестве основного кандидата от оппозиции, противостоявшего действующему премьер-министру Сержу Саркисяну. Выборы прошли по печально известному сценарию: режим преследовал представителей оппозиции, подкупал и запугивал избирателей, подделывал избирательные бюллетени, и систематически мошенничал при подсчете голосов. В действительности, подтасовка результатов началась задолго до 19 февраля. На всем протяжении кампании, телевидение, являющееся основным средством массовой информации в стране и находящееся под жестким контролем режима, изливало поток пропаганды, который заставил бы покраснеть от стыда советских пропагандистов брежневских времен.
У нас, оппозиции, все это вызывало негодование, но не удивление. Что нас действительно удивило и расстроило – это глухое молчание Запада. Еще больше задел нас формальный отчет наблюдательной миссии Организации по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе, покорно подтвердивший карикатурные претензии Саркисяна на победу.
Народ Армении, в отличие от наблюдателей ОБСЕ, предпочел не закрывать глаза на то, что происходило на избирательных участках. Напротив, люди проигнорировали заявления Саркисяна, и вышли на улицы, требуя отмены результатов выборов. На площади перед зданием Оперы был организован непрерывный митинг протеста, ставший истинным праздником свободы, который должен войти в учебники как пример ненасильственного, законного сопротивления нелегитимному режиму.
Утром в воскресенье, встревоженные растущим день ото дня числом протестующих власти решились прибегнуть к силе. Спецназу был дан приказ рассеять толпу, захватить лидеров оппозиции и поместить меня под домашний арест. Несколько часов спустя, люди собрались в другом месте, чтобы встретиться со своими лидерами, но вместо этого их встретили силы спецназа, позднее подкрепленными армейскими подразделениями, которым было приказано подавить выступления протеста. За выходные погибло не меньше восьми человек, в городе было объявлено чрезвычайное положение.
Как мы до этого дошли? Почему режим, возглавляемый уходящим президентом Робертом Кочаряном и ‘избранным президентом’ Саркисяном, считает себя вправе применять силу против собственного народа. Разумеется, у них есть свои причины так думать, но важнейшая из них – поведение Запада, дающего режиму понять, пусть даже ненамеренно, что ему не нужно беспокоиться по поводу реакции международного сообщества.
Мы, армяне, сейчас пытаемся осмыслить, в чем корни этого безразличия к насилию над нашей демократией со стороны режима Кочаряна-Саркисяна. Пока у нас есть два объяснения: во-первых, некоторые влиятельные лица и организации на Западе, и в особенности в Европе, все еще сохраняют наивную веру в идею позитивного подкрепления. Похоже, они думают, что, хваля за небольшие улучшения, вместо того, чтобы критиковать серьезные недостатки, они стимулируют хорошее поведение. Однако любой, кто ближе знаком с этим режимом, понимает абсурдность такого подхода.
Вторая, и возможно более важная, причина связана с распространенной уверенностью в том, что давний конфликт вокруг Нагорного Карабаха способны разрешить только лидеры, которые сами происходят из Нагорного Карабаха, как Кочарян и Саркисян, и в патриотизме которых внутри страны не сомневаются. Это та самая логика, по которой ‘только Никсон мог поехать в Китай’. Проблема в том, что за 10 лет нахождения Кочаряна и Саркисяна у власти, для продвижения переговорного процесса почти ничего сделано не было. Еще важнее то, что лидер, которому предстоит сделать важный и нелегкий выбор, должен обладать доверием народа. Саркисян им не обладает. После того, что он и Кочарян проделали 1 марта, он не сможет даже просто управлять страной, не то, что принимать трудные решения.
Итак, что же следует делать? Чего народ Армении ожидает от Запада, и особенно от Соединенных Штатов? Как минимум, мы ожидаем прямого и недвусмысленного осуждения событий 1 марта, причем ответственность за происшедшее должна быть возложена на правительство, а не на оппозицию. Помимо этого, необходимо предупредить режим о недопустимости преследования оппозиции и ее лидеров, достигающего в последнее время беспрецедентных масштабов, и потребовать от него снять ограничения, наложенные на прессу и восстановить право на свободу собраний и получение беспристрастной информации. Мы также ожидаем пересмотра результатов выборов. Любой серьезный пересмотр неминуемо приведет к выводу о необходимости проведения новых выборов.
Если эти шаги не будут предприняты, армянам придется сделать из этой ситуации два крайне нежелательных вывода: что мирные и законные методы политической борьбы неэффективны и бессмысленны, и что Запад демократия заботит только в тех случаях, когда это политически выгодно. Запад должен сделать все возможное, чтобы граждане Армении не пришли к подобным заключениям.
Левон Тер-Петросян – президент Армении с 1991 по 1998 год, на проходивших в этом году президентских выборах выступал в качестве основного кандидата от оппозиции. В настоящий момент находится под домашним арестом.
March 5th, 2008
ALMA ATA, Feb. 28 (Xinhua)—The World Bank plans to extend 300 million U.S. dollars in fresh loans to Uzbekistan in the next three years, local media in Tashkent reported Thursday.
The World Bank representative office in Uzbekistan was quoted as saying that the loans will be extended between the 2008 and the 2010 fiscal year, funding programs ranging from environment protection, social welfare to agriculture.
The loans will be repaid in 40 years, including a 10-year preferential period with an annual interest rate of 0.75 percent.
Uzbekistan became a World Bank member state in 1995. Up to now, the World Bank has provided 654 million dollars in various types of loans to the Central Asian country.
Editor: Yao Siyan
SOURCE:www.chinaview.cn
February 29th, 2008
Translated from Ezgulik website
The relatives of Sanjar Umarov have contacted “Ezgulik,” the Uzbek society for human rights. Their petition states that he is being subjected to torture while being held in prison 64-47 near the city of Navoi. The petition also states that Sanjar Umarov, who was accused of crimes relating to theft of government property and official misconduct, has spent most of his time in correctional facility UYa 64-47 in isolation where he has been constantly oppressed and subjected to torture.
In an effort to clarify the situation, “Ezgulik” requested an investigation from the central office for correctional facilities and from the General Prosecutor of the Republic of Uzbekistan (letter dated April 4, 2007, No. 18). An answer was received from the prosecutor of Novoi oblast, B.I. Norov (letter dated April 24, 2007, No. 17.49.07). This letter states that due to violation of local internal prison regulations, beginning on May 25, 2006, Sanjar Umarov was placed in isolation “a few times.”
With the aim of objectively studying S. Umarov’s situation and providing him legal representation, activists of “Ezgulik” hired Rustam Rakhmatullayev, a member of the lawyer’s guild from the Shaikhontokhursk region. The activists and the lawyer then arranged a trip to the correctional facility (such trips have been previously organized for human rights activists such as Dilmurod Mukhiddinov, Mamarazhab Nazarov, Azam Farmonov, A. Karomatov and Ulugbek Kattabekov).
According to Vasila Inoyatova, who participated in the trip, its goal at UYa 64-47 was to determine the general health of Sanjar Umarov and to find out exactly why he was being tortured. Also, the laws concerning amnesty and how they applied to S. Umarov were discussed. The treatment of S. Umarov was also discussed in relation to the annual speech made to a UN committee on torture by the Uzbek Minister of Internal Affairs, Alisher Sharofutdinov, in which he reported that “the case of Sanjar Umarov and others will be reviewed and looked at from a humanitarian point of view.”
According to the prison’s director, a colonel Abdullayev, Sanjar Umarov stated that he did not want to meet with V. Inoyatova, the chairman of Ezgulik, or with a lawyer, and that he did not need any legal representation and he did not wish to see anybody. It was as if S. Umarov categorically refused their offer to protect him and did not want them ever to return to the prison. The activists of Ezgulik waited at the prison gate for more than three hours for a response to their inquiry. However, the prison administration supplied nothing more than what is mentioned above. Actually, recently, during a meeting of Sanjar Umarov with his son, Arslan Umarov, he was informed that members of Ezgulik were planning on visiting him in prison and that his case was being reviewed by a lawyer. And most importantly, Sanjar Umarov was ready for a meeting with them.
Lawyer R. Rakhmatullayev confirmed that in all his years of legal practice, this is the first time that he had a legal lawyer’s order but was not allowed to see the prisoner. The administration of the prison has allowed violations of rights to legal defense which are spelled out in Uzbekistan’s constitution, its criminal code, and in documents of the Supreme Court. The prisoner’s rights to a legal defense have been violated.
From the above one can make the following conclusion: these actions by the administration of prison UYa 64-47 show at least that Sanjar Umarov’s condition is serious and that he is being subjected to torture. That fact that no amnesty has been provided for him and that he has not been allowed to see his close relatives, proves that the prison is trying to hide the real situation concerning S. Umarov’s condition and that laws are being broken, and that he is being singled out as explained above.
At a time when Uzbekistan is again becoming closer to the European Union, and the world is looking more closely at Uzbekistan, one can say convincingly that such actions and relationships toward human rights activists and representatives of society can no longer be kept hidden.
The Ezgulik activists and their lawyer immediately reported the results of their prison visit to the General Prosecutor of Uzbekistan and to the directorate of prisons under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They also informed international organizations and representatives of the diplomatic corps. The general public was also informed. Since so many laws and regulations of the criminal code, the legal codex and national and international legislation were violated, Ezgulik filed their report in the form of a protest.
Considering the high interest level of the general public, Ezgulik believes that the General Prosecutor of Uzbekistan must immediately provide feedback to this question. The public calls on the administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to review the misconduct and illegal activities by colonel Abdullayev at prison UYa 64-47.
Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan “Ezgulik”
SOURCE:Ezgulik
February 12th, 2008
TASHKENT (AFP) — The head of the US Central Command, Admiral William Fallon, met Thursday with Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov, state television reported, in a one of the highest-level visits to the gas-rich ex-Soviet republic by a US official in years.
“We consider your visit a remarkable event in mutual relations between Uzbekistan and the US … and a good chance for discussing military-technical cooperation,” Karimov told Fallon.
Fallon also met the country’s defence and foreign ministers.
Uzbekistan’s relations with the United States deteriorated after Washington condemned the bloody repression of unrest in the city of Andijan in May 2005.
Uzbekistan retaliated by evicting a US air base that had been set up near the Afghan border following the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Uzbekistan has also been criticised for widespread human rights abuses and suppression of political opposition.
The United States and other countries called for an independent investigation of the Andijan incident, in which witnesses said security forces shot dead hundreds of people. The authorities say 187 people died, all due to the activities of Islamist insurgents.
Karimov said last December that Uzbekistan was keen to mend ties with the West.
Prior to arriving in Tashkent, William Fallon visited Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
SOURCE:AFP
January 26th, 2008
In an open letter on January 17, some 100 Uzbek dissidents and activists abroad and 40 in the country say the forced use of child labor in the Uzbek cotton industry has become a “deliberate state policy” aimed at “acquiring extra profits.”
Child labor has existed since the Soviet era in Uzbekistan, the world’s third-largest cotton exporter. But the letter, the second such appeal by Uzbek activists in as many months, says that in recent years forced child labor has spread on a “mass scale,” and that working conditions for thousands of minors who toil in Uzbek fields have worsened.
One of the letter’s signatories is Nadejda Atayeva, who heads a Paris-based Association on Human Rights in Central Asia.
“As you know, child labor has been used to pick and proceed cotton for many years [in Uzbekistan], and the time came when we decided to raise this problem,” says Atayeva, whose group is behind the campaign to boycott Uzbek cotton. “We wrote the petition to the international community in order to start debate and address the issue properly because efforts to solve the problem inside the country did not bring any success so far.”
Global Attention
Concerns over the use of forced child labor in Uzbekistan began attracting more international attention in October, after the BBC aired a documentary that showed Uzbek children picking cotton for clothing sold in Britain.
The BBC’s “Newsnight” program filmed an Uzbek cotton field full of schoolchildren, some as young as 9, hard at work. The documentary showed how children were accompanied by a police escort, which cleared the road for buses and trucks loaded with mattresses to take the kids to cotton fields or back to the barracks. One boy said he was paid just two pence per kilogram—40 percent less than officials in the capital, Tashkent, said pickers were paid.
Following the expose, several international companies said they would stop buying Uzbek cotton. Swedish retail giant H&M, Finland’s Marimekko, and Estonia’s Krenholm were the first. This week, they were joined by Britain’s Tesco, the world’s third-largest retailer, and by Marks and Spencer, Britain’s largest retailer.
“We are really thrilled Marks and Spencer have just announced they will no longer be buying cotton from Uzbekistan,” says Juliette Williams, who leads the Uzbek boycott campaign for the Environmental Justice Foundation, a British-based NGO. “And they are telling all their suppliers the same message—that they need to make sure that there is no Uzbek cotton in the production process to make clothes that will be sold in Marks and Spencer stores. We are really thrilled at that. It’s quite a victory.”
Williams says the decisions by Britain’s major retailers have the potential to change a multibillion-dollar industry and stop abuses such as forced child labor. The boycott could also spread beyond Europe, a major buyer of Uzbek cotton and where one in every four garments contains it.
In Bangladesh, textile and yarn producers tell RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service they might look for alternative sources for cotton if Uzbekistan, which supplies most of cotton used in Bangladesh, does not stop its child-labor practices.
Boycotting The Boycott
Not everyone has embraced the boycott.
The International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC), a U.S.-based group that promotes the world cotton trade, called the allegations by Uzbek activists “exaggerated” and “absurd.” The ICAC’s statement came after the Uzbek activists issued an initial appeal on November 16 to boycott Uzbek cotton.
ICAC Executive Director Terry Townsend has ruled out what he called “factual errors” on the use of defoliants and pesticides in cotton fields that activists claim Uzbek children are inhaling, as well as information on the level of pay for child workers and other issues. Writing on November 30, he concluded that a boycott of Uzbek cotton in international markets would be “highly impractical.”
Nevertheless, Townsend says his committee’s panel would be involved in “gathering objective information” pertaining to the allegations. The panel will present its findings during the ICAC plenary meeting in Burkina Faso in November 2008, he wrote.
Atayeva said this week’s statement was partly in response to the ICAC’s reaction to the original call for a boycott. The activists’ November appeal was sent to the European Union and the governments of the United States, Russia, and China, as well as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, the UN’s Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the International Labor Organization.
Cotton revenues are a major source of hard currency for Uzbekistan, with around $1 billion in annual exports. But activists say it’s especially lucrative for the ruling elite, such as President Islam Karimov’s family and cronies. They say the boycott will not affect ordinary Uzbeks.
The Hidden Cost
Officials in Tashkent have not publicly reacted to recent international outcry. However, in the past they have denied the use of forced child labor in the country’s agricultural sector, saying Tashkent adheres to international conventions on child labor and “forbids any form of child labor in cotton fields and other agricultural sectors.”
Atayeva, a former schoolteacher, was fired from her job in Uzbekistan for refusing to send sick schoolchildren to the cotton fields. She says the letter’s signatories are all Uzbeks with firsthand experience of conditions in Uzbek cotton fields, and that foreigners who deny their accusations appear to have been deceived by the Uzbek government.
“Our appeal is based on our concern over the fate of Uzbekistan’s children, who are deprived of a proper education at the expense of collecting ‘white gold,’” Atayeva says.
(RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service contributed to this report.)
SOURCE:RFE/RL
January 23rd, 2008
DUSHANBE (Reuters) – U.S. Admiral William Fallon plans to visit Uzbekistan soon, he said on Tuesday, in what would be the first high-level attempt to mend ties since relations broke off in 2005.
The United States condemned Uzbekistan, once a U.S. ally in its war on terror, when troops fired on a protest in the town of Andizhan in 2005. Uzbekistan in return evicted U.S. troops from a key military airbase used as a hub for U.S. operations in Afghanistan.
Fallon, head of the U.S. military Central Command, said he planned to visit the Central Asian nation but did not say when.
“I would like to pay a future visit to Tashkent,” he told reporters during a visit to Tajikistan, another Central Asian nation bordering Afghanistan.
The U.S. embassy in Uzbekistan confirmed that a visit was planned but did not disclose the date.
Fallon was tight-lipped on the agenda but said he had no plans to discuss the airbase issue.
“But in any event a visit there would not involve any discussions on the base from my initiative,” Fallon said.
“That’s not something that we have on our agenda,” he said, adding he would travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan first.
Uzbekistan’s ties with the West suffered a blow in 2005 when troops fired on protesters in Andizhan, killing hundreds, according to witnesses.
The Uzbek government blamed the violence on Islamic rebels and said only security forces and terrorists died at the time.
In another sign of more active diplomatic contacts, Pierre Morel, EU Special Representative for Central Asia, met Uzbek President Islam Karimov in Tashkent last week.
(Reporting by Roman Kozhevnikov; writing by Olzhas Auyezov; editing by Richard Balmforth)
SOURCE:REUTERS
January 23rd, 2008
MOSCOW (Thomson Financial) – Uzbekistan will charge Russia up to 50 pct more for natural gas exports in 2008, the Russian daily Gazeta reported, citing a report by the Avesta Investment Group.
The report said the price of gas exports will be 130 usd per 1,000 cubic metres in the first half of 2008, rising to 150 usd in the second half.
OAO Gazprom, the state-owned buyer, declined to comment on the report, Gazeta said.
Russia depends on imports of natural gas from the Central Asian states of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan for domestic needs and to fulfil gas export agreements at higher prices to Ukraine and western Europe.
In 2007, Uzbekistan sold Gazprom 9 bln cubic metres of gas at 100 usd per 1,000 cubic metres.
Turkmenistan has also increased the price of its gas exports to Russia for 2008 up to 150 usd per 1,000 cubic metres.
SOURCE: Forbes
January 13th, 2008
MOSCOW, Jan 4 (IPS) – A group of civil society activists has called for immediate boycott of Uzbek cotton produced by forced child labour.
Unlike other developing countries, they say, child labour in the cotton sector of Uzbekistan is not the result of poverty but of a coercion policy adopted by the central government.
“Under the Soviet Union, forced labour was accompanied by some care for the health of children, the quality of their nutrition, and development of the rural social infrastructure,” Nadejda Atayeva, president of the Paris-based group Human Rights in Central Asia told IPS on email. “Now forced labour is compensated neither by decent payment, nor through public funds.”
Every year, starting September, schools across the country are closed for more than two months. Students are forced to pick cotton by order of central and local authorities.
Children work at least eight hours daily on the cotton fields, sometimes without rest for days. They inhale dust, laden with residues of chemicals, pesticides and defoliants used in the fields before the cotton harvest.
“Children’s normal education is interrupted to serve the interest of the small elite who benefit grossly from the high profits from trading cotton on the world market,” Surat Ikramov, chairman of the Initiative Group of Independent Human Rights Defenders of Uzbekistan told IPS from Tashkent.
“It’s time to begin radical reforms in the cotton industry, to do away with exploitation of teenagers, and abolish forced child labour in the cotton fields,” Ikramov said. “As a result of forced child labour, children cannot learn in schools and colleges during this academic period, and lag behind in the school curriculum, while some children fall sick from hard work and exhaustion.”
Rights activists say that refusal to collect cotton can be punished by expulsion from the educational institution. There have been cases when students were beaten up by school staff for refusing to work for the cotton harvest. Child labour provides more than half of the cotton produced in Uzbekistan. Payment to the children is negligible.
Statistics on children employed in the cotton sector in Uzbekistan are difficult to obtain, but the London-based rights group Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) says around 200,000 children work in the major cotton-producing region Ferghana. Ferghana is a city with a population of 185,000, about 420 km east of capital Tashkent.
“It is certainly reasonable to assume that there are many tens of thousands of children and students forced to work in the fields each year,” programme director at EJF Juliette Williams told IPS.
“Children are being used as cheap labour force by a government which imposes Soviet-style cotton quotas, and which is unwilling to pay a decent living wage to cotton farmers and labourers, thereby ensuring that children are used instead of adults,” Williams said.
“The use of children ensures maximum profits to the ruling elite, which benefits from the supply of cotton to western consumers,” Williams said. Just three trading companies controlled by President Islam Karimov’s family are licensed to export cotton.
EJF says this use of child labour violates international laws and conventions to which many governments of cotton-producing countries are signatories.
The practice violates the UN convention on the rights of a child. That convention provides that children have a right “to be protected from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous, or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.”
“As forced labour on the cotton harvest prevents children from attending school oftentimes for over a third of the academic year, it clearly violates the children’s right to an education. Work on the harvest and exposure to pesticides and defoliants is also demonstrably detrimental to children’s health,” Cassandra Cavanaugh, who was senior researcher for Human Rights Watch from 1998 to 2001 in central Asia told IPS.
“The simple fact is that cheap clothing and other cotton items in the developed world are being subsidised by child labourers in poor cotton producing countries,” Williams said. “We believe that consumers do have a choice and that every time they spend their money they are effectively casting a vote for the way in which they want the world to look—they can opt to choose cotton products made without use of child labour or in abusive conditions, and should send this clear message to retailers and manufacturers.”
Atayeva agrees that in order to break the existing system it is necessary to deprive those who control cotton export of their unfair profits.
“Under the circumstances, only international boycott of Uzbek cotton can achieve that goal. The boycott will force the Uzbek government to repeal child labour and provide farmers with real economic freedom. The cotton sector in Uzbekistan can still be profitable without exploitation of children and forced labour.”
The rights activists have called on the European Bank and the World Bank to refrain from financing projects in the cotton and textile sectors in Uzbekistan until needed reforms are carried out. (END/2008)
By Kester Kenn Klomegah
SOURCE:IPSNews
January 4th, 2008
Wife asks for release of husband jailed in Uzbekistan
By Bartholomew Sullivan (Contact)
Sunday, December 23, 2007
WASHINGTON —With presidential elections in Uzbekistan slated for today, the Germantown family of an imprisoned Uzbek opposition leader are speaking out to gain his release.
Sanjar Umarov, 51, whose extended family lives in the Aintree Farms section of Germantown, has been held since he was arrested in October 2005 for a variety of financial crimes that his family maintains are a pretext for silencing him.
The coalition party he formed—Serkuesh Uzbekistonim (Sunshine Uzbekistan)—favors democratic, free-market capitalism for the resource-rich former Soviet republic. Umarov, a former physicist-mathematician turned Uzbek oligarch with interests in oil, cotton and telecommunications, is chairman of the secular political party, the main opposition to the government of President Islam Karimov.
Karimov, who has been the country’s supreme leader since before the Soviet Union was dissolved, is once again a candidate. He turns 70 in January.
One of Umarov’s three sons, Gulam Umarov, 29, last week circulated a letter from his mother, Indira, to various European human rights and multinational organizations, including the European Union and European Parliament, asking that her husband be accorded humane treatment and visits with his lawyer.
“Since his imprisonment, my husband has been subjected to moral and psychological forms of torture,” Umarov wrote Dec. 12. “Following (his) transfer to Kizil Tepa U. Ya 64/67 prison camp in May 2006, he was placed in solitary confinement for more than 13 months, during which he was let out of isolation cell for a total of only three days.”
“During this time, he was prevented from reading any letters or receiving any of the food and clothing that we sent him,” the letter said. It ended with a plea to “help free Sanjar Umarov and others who have suffered for their ideological belief.”
There is concern, voiced recently by Amnesty International, that prisoners in Uzbek facilities are routinely subjected to torture. Early in his confinement, Umarov was seen by a lawyer who reported that he appeared disoriented as if under the influence of psychotropic drugs administered against his will.
A France-based group, Association Droits de l’Homme en Asie Centrale (the Association for Human Rights in Central Asia) has asked the Uzbek government to consider an amnesty for political prisoners like Umarov. It suggests those interested e-mail letters to Presidents_Office@press-service.uz, an address that could not be confirmed as accurate.
Washington correspondent Bartholomew Sullivan can be reached at (202) 408-2726.
Child labor alleged
At the same time, efforts are under way to free Sanjar Umarov, questions are being raised about child labor in the Uzbek cotton industry, with campaigns aimed at dissuading countries from buying it and consumers from wearing it.
Cotton is an important source of foreign exchange for the country.
A brief documentary on YouTube by the Environmental Justice Foundation asserts that children as young as 7 are forced to pick cotton by hand for up to 70 hours a week.
The International Cotton Advisory Committee, in a letter to civic activists on the child labor issue, said that it was aware of the allegations but had assumed they were exaggerated.
“However, this issue has now risen to a level of public awareness that merits a reasoned response,” the committee’s executive director, Terry P. Townsend, said in a letter. But he said that, in their efforts to call for a boycott of Uzbek cotton, the campaign has made several factual errors. Children are not picking cotton right after it has been sprayed with pesticides and defoliants, Townsend noted.
Townsend said he has urged the government of Uzbekistan to permit the United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF, and the International Labor Organization to study the child labor situation and report to the international community.
SOURCE:Commercial Appeal
December 24th, 2007
Severe Restrctions Persist on Political Opposition and Independent Media
(New York, December 21, 2007) The Uzbek presidential election on December 23 cannot be free or fair, said Human Rights Watch today.
Uzbekistan’s longstanding and well-documented record of restricting opposition political activity and independent media prevents any semblance of a competitive electoral process.
“None of the conditions exist for free and fair elections,” said Holly Cartner, Europe and Central Asia director of Human Rights Watch. “While there are four candidates, it would be absurd to speak of a competitive process. There is no real choice.”
The Central Election Commission has approved four candidates – including President Islam Karimov – to run in the election. However, an interim report by the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’s Election Observation Mission, which is part of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), covering the period December 5 – 15, stated that “all candidates publicly support the policies of President Karimov. There are no debates between candidates and no campaign materials of a competitive nature, which has been explained by Uzbek traditions not favoring confrontational election campaigns.”
Opposition political parties cannot operate freely in Uzbekistan, and there has not been a single election there that the OSCE has found to be free or fair. Opposition parties and movements such as Birlik (Unity), Erk (Liberty), Ozod Dekhkon (Free Peasant Party) and the Sunshine Coalition are denied registration or prevented from holding meetings. In March 2006, Sanjar Umarov and Nodira Khidoiatova, who are Sunshine Coalition leaders, were sentenced to 14 and 10 years in prison, respectively, on a variety of politically motivated charges. Umarov’s sentence was later reduced to seven years, while Khidoiatova was conditionally released. Umarov’s lawyer, Vitaly Krasilovsky, fled the country after articles in the state-controlled media accused him of supporting terrorists.
The government severely restricts free expression and persecutes independent journalists whose work is critical of the authorities. Many websites providing critical information on Uzbekistan are blocked by the authorities and are not accessible to people in the country, including www.ferghana.ru, www.muslimuzbekistan.org, the Human Rights Watch website, www.hrw.org, and others. However, the Uzbek state-run media does provide airtime to foreigners who praise the conduct of the elections and the state of democracy in Uzbekistan.
SOURCE: Human Rights Watch
December 22nd, 2007
Association Droits de l’Homme en Asie Centrale
Centre MBE 140, 16, rue de Docteur Leroy, 72000 LE MANS FRANCE
Tel.: +33 6 13 41 40 70 E-mail: asiecentrale@neuf.fr
PRESS RELEASE
Uzbekistan: dossier of a political prisoner December 14, 2007
Will the Leader of the Coalition “Sunshine Uzbekistan,” Sanjar Umarov, be Granted Amnesty?
Sanjar Umarov spent 420 days at the solitaire confinement during 2 years held in custody. His family was informed of this only three months ago, since until now it has been impossible to meet with him. He has not been allowed to correspond, either in writing or by telephone, with his friends and family. His complaints regarding his health have been ignored by the authorities. Attempts by his lawyer to see him have been fruitless. Sanjar Umarov’s family is extremely worried about his health.
Sanjar Umarov – Born in 1956, in Tashkent, has a wife, three sons, and two daughters. Leader of the coalition “Sunshine Uzbekistan.” Accused of economic crimes. Sentenced to 14 years, six months, and prohibited from business activities five years after serving his sentence. Imprisoned at penal colony KIN UYA 64-47 in the Navoi region.
In 2005 Sanjar Umarov began to unite various organizations into one coalition under the name “Sunshine Uzbekistan.” He sought a dialogue with president Islam Karimov. This announcement by the coalition alarmed the authorities. This new organization differed from previous ones in that it proposed a new concept of reforms. Many highly qualified specialists from various spheres of society assisted in preparing the documentation for these reforms.
Shortly after the founding of the coalition, the tragedy in Andijan occurred. Sanjar Umarov openly supported the independent international investigation of the events in Andijan, in which hundreds of citizens lost their lives, shot to death. However, S. Umarov was against introducing sanctions against Uzbekistan proposed by the European Union, believing it would lead to further isolation of the regime.
In October, 2005, Sanjar Umarov was arrested. The court case against him was absurd, and the verdict was harsh.
Sanjar Umarov’s situation demands immediate intervention by the Supreme Council of the United Nations on Human Rights, by the European Council, and by other international organizations.
There must be immediate provisions for:
- humanitarian treatment for the prisoner, Sanjar Umarov, and the cessation of psychological pressure being put upon him;
- access to him by a representative of the International Red Cross;
- access to Sanjar Umarov by his lawyer;
- telephone conversations with his family;
- a review of Sanjar Umarov’s case, based upon a recent directive of the Olij Mazhlis[1] of the Republic of Uzbekistan concerning amnesty in conjunction with the 15th anniversary of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
A general amnesty was announced in Uzbekistan on November 30, 2007. The European Union began a dialogue with the leaders of Uzbekistan concerning human rights, which raised the expectations of the general public. Sanjar Umarov’s wife wrote a letter in strong support of the amnesty[2].
President I. Karimov, in an effort to further strengthen his authority, liquidated all elements of liberalism which arose during the era of M. Gorbachev. In the name of “security and stability,” all of society’s institutions and values were liquidated by a dedicated effort of cleansing society from any sort of dissent.
The association of “Human Rights in Central Asia” implores all interested parties, organizations, and the media to take measures regarding the fate of Sanjar Umarov by contacting Uzbekistan authorities at the addresses listed below.
Addresses:
President of Uzbekistan, Islam Abduganiyevich Karimov, ul. Uzbekistanskaya 43, Rezidentsia prezidenta, 700163 Tashkent, Republic of Uzbekistan, Fax: +998 71 133 1395325, E-mail: presidents_office@press-service.uz
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vladimir Norov, Ministerstvo inostrannykh del RU, pl. Mustakillik 5; 700029 Tashkent, Republic of Uzbekistan, Fax: + 998 71 139 15 17, E-mail: rnews@mfa.uz
Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights, Sayora Rashidova, ul. Xalqlar Dostligi 1, 700035 Tashkent, Republic of Uzbekistan, Fax: +998 71 139 85 55, E-mail: office@ombudsman.gov.uz
Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Ubaydulla Mingbaev, Verkhovny Sud Respubliki Uzbekistan, ul. Abdulla Kodiri 1, 700183 Tashkent; Republic of Uzbekistan, Fax: + 998 71 144-62-93
General Prosecutor of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Rashidjon Hamidovich Kodirov, ul. Gulyamova 66, 700047 Tashkent, Republic of Uzbekistan, Fax: +998 71 133 39 17, E-mail: prokuratura@lawyer.com
Head of Prison UYA 64/47, Colonel M. Abdullaev, Kizil-Tepa, Navoii Region Uzbekistan, Index 210400
National Centre for Human Rights, Senator Akmal Saidov Natsionalny, Tsentr po pravam cheloveka, Mustakillik Maidoni 5/3, 700029 Tashkent, Republic of Uzbekistan, Fax: + 998 71 139 13 56 / 45 16, E-mail: office@nchr.uz
Ambassador of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the United Nations in Geneva, PO Box 1853, 1215 Geneva 15, Switzerland, Fax: +41 22 799 43 02, E-mail: uzbekistan@bluewin.ch
Please contact the President of Association “Human Rights in Central Asia”, Nadejda Atayeva, in regards to any actions that take place at: asiecentrale@neuf.fr
December 16th, 2007
GENEVA, Nov 23 (Reuters) – The United Nations torture watchdog accused police and prison staff in Uzbekistan on Friday of the “routine use of torture” and called for a full investigation of numerous alleged cases of torture and cruelty. Uzbek authorities should adopt a “zero-tolerance” approach to the problem, prosecute perpetrators and compensate victims, the U.N. Committee against Torture said.
The body, composed of 10 independent experts, issued a report after examining the records of six countries including Uzbekistan during a three-week meeting. The others were Benin, Estonia, Latvia, Norway and Portugal.
On Uzbekistan, it expressed concern at “numerous, ongoing and consistent allegations concerning routine use of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment committed by law enforcement and investigative personnel”.
Torture and cruelty were often used to extract confessions or information to be used in criminal proceedings in the resource-rich former Soviet state, it said.
“Our issues of concern were the widespread allegations of torture. The allegations are that they take place largely in the early period when a person is arrested,” Felice Gaer, an American expert on the U.N. committee, told a news briefing.
“There has been a failure to conduct prompt investigations into claims and allegations of torture,” she added.
KARIMOV ACCUSED, DENIES ALLEGATIONS
Some Western nations have accused Uzbek leader Islam Karimov, seeking re-election in next month’s presidential vote in the mostly Muslim country, of allowing human rights violations and systematic torture in jails. He has denied the allegations.
The U.N. body also voiced concern at “numerous allegations of excessive use of force and ill-treatment by Uzbek military and security forces” who opened fire on a crowd in the town of Andizhan in May 2005.
It called for a full and impartial inquiry by credible independent experts into the event. Uzbek officials have acknowledged 187 people were killed, but other sources put the death toll at “700 or more”, according to the committee.
On Thursday, relatives and human rights campaigners said that two prisoners who died in jail in Uzbekistan this month had marks on their bodies consistent with torture. Both men had been in jail on charges of Islamist extremism in Andizhan.
“We also addressed the need to establish in practice independent monitoring of detention places. A system of unannounced visits would help, we know this from our work all over the world,” Gaer said.
There was also a need to “establish in practice access to lawyers, doctors and members of family for anyone who is detained,” she added, noting this was not routinely offered.
“Remember that torture is impermissible in all circumstances, regardless of the crime committed, regardless of the circumstances,” Gaer said. (Editing by Jonathan Lynn and Tim Pearce)
By Stephanie Nebehay
SOURCE:REUTERS
November 23rd, 2007
Islam Karimov, the President of Uzbekistan, plans to run for re-election next month, despite controversy over the legitimacy of a third term for the authoritarian leader.
The Liberal Democratic Party on Tuesday nominated Karimov as its candidate in the Dec. 23 vote, according to the weekly Asr XXI, which translates as Century 21.
“It’s a big honor,” Karimov was as saying at the meeting Tuesday after his nomination. “I truly realize all the responsibility that comes with your trust.”
Karimov, 69, has ruled the Central Asian nation with an iron hand since before the 1991 Soviet collapse, stifling opposition and silencing critics.
He has won two presidential elections that were not recognized by international observers as free or fair, and had his term extended twice through referendums. His current term expired in January, but he exploited a legal loophole to stay for an extra year.
The constitution limits presidents to two consecutive terms. While Karimov was already in his second term when constitutional changes adopted in 2002 extended presidential terms from five years to seven years, there has been no official explanation of his right to seek a third term.
Uzbekistan had hosted a U.S. air base supporting the U.S. military campaign in neighboring Afghanistan, but kicked the U.S. troops out in the wake of Western criticism over the 2005 government suppression of an uprising in the eastern city of Andijan.
Four other pro-Karimov parties have nominated candidates for the presidential election, but they were seen by observers as nominal figures fielded to create an illusion of a democratic vote.
Five opposition candidates – including rights advocates, a writer and a street vendor – have been denied registration and faced official pressure, intimidation and threats. They are affiliated with the Sunshine Uzbekistan opposition group, whose founder was sentenced in March 2006 to eight years in prison on money laundering charges he said were trumped up.
In a statement, the Tashkent-based Uzbek Rights Defense Alliance called on the international community not to recognize the election.
Also Wednesday, U.S.-based Human Rights Watch said Uzbekistan should be condemned for flagrantly violating a global torture ban, as the United Nations’ anti-torture panel prepared for a two-day hearing into treatment of inmates at Uzbek prisons.
In a 90-page report, Human Rights Watch accused Karimov’s government of employing a wide range of torture methods on detainees, from beatings with truncheons and water bottles to asphyxiation with plastic bags and gas masks, electric shocks and sexual humiliation.
SOURCE: Pravda.ru
November 20th, 2007
On July, 10th 2007 democratic opposition parties of Uzbekistan met in Sweden to discuss the modern economic situation in the republic and the concept of attracting a wide range of civil society to a discussion of alternative economic reforms in Uzbekistan. A decision was reached to have a round table of representatives from the youth wing of these parties to discuss the problems of Uzbekistan. The event will be held in the second half of August, with the participation of international economists and mass-media.
July 14th, 2007
To:
The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), Council of the European Union
Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union
Members of the European Parliament
Vladimir Putin, President of Russian Federation
Nursultan Nazarbaev, President of Kazakhstan
CC:
Central Asian unit, European Commission
European Parliament delegation to Central Asia
Foreign Ministries of the EU member states
Parliaments of the EU member-states
OSCE
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, OSCE
US Department of State
US Senate and House of Representatives
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, US Congress
UN Human Rights Council
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
May, 2007
One the eve of the second anniversary of the tragic events in the city of Andijan, we the undersigned, express our solidarity with the victims of Andijan and the victims of the Government of Uzbekistan’s continuing, brutal repression of those who dare to dissent, defend human rights and build a civil society independent of Government domination. In support of these victims, we call on the OSCE and European Union to include representatives from Uzbekistan’s independent human rights and opposition movements in the proposed EUUzbekistan Inter-Parliamentary Dialogue on Human Rights and to ensure that:
1. The GOU’s cynical strategy of equating any and all expressions of peaceful dissent to radical Islamic terrorism is not successful in isolating Uzbekistan’s independent civil society from international support and recognition.
2. The GOU initiates an authentic dialogue with Uzbekistan’s civil society to map out a consensual strategy for a thorough reform of its catastrophic political, economic and social polices.
3. Those GOU officials responsible for turning Uzbekistan’s police and prosecutorial organs into a corrupt and fully operational terror machine are held accountable for their subversion of justice under international and Republic of Uzbekistan laws.
4. The GOU is clearly and directly notified that any improvement in its relationships with the world’s democratic nations is directly dependent on immediate and substantial steps to improve its human rights record including freedom for political prisoners:
Umida NIYAZOVA, Sanjar UMAROV, Mutabar TADJIBAEVA, Alisher KAROMATOV, Azam FARMONOV, Mamadali MAKHMUDOV, Saidjahon ZAYNOBIDDINOV, Akhmedjon ADILOV, Gulbakhor TURAEVA, Norboy XOLJIGITOV, Abdurasul XUDOYNAZAROV, Mamarajab NAZAROV, Dilmurod MUHIDDINOV, Bobomurod MAVLONOV, Ulugbek KATTABEKOV, Ihtiyor HAMROEV, Mukhammed BEGJANOV, Rashid BEGJANOV, Isroiljon HOLDAROV, Mourod JOURAYEV, Ruhiddin FAHRUDDINOV, Habibulla AKPULATOV
We also call upon the governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan to support the OSCE and the EU in their efforts to change the GOU’s counterproductive policies of wholesale political repression. The tragic events of May 13, 2005
could have been avoided if Uzbekistan’s rulers listened to the voices of their own people. The people of Uzbekistan look to you, our brotherly neighbors, to assist us in saving our nation from the disaster that continued heartless repression will visit upon us.
Signatures:
1. Nigara Khidoyatova, leader of the Free Peasants Party, Uzbekistan
2. Bakhodir Namazov, Chairman of the Committee for Freedom of Political Prisoners, Uzbekistan
3. Gulambek Sanjar Umarov, Sunshine Uzbekistan Coalition, USA
4. Elena Urlaeva, Human Rights Alliance, Uzbekistan
5. Shahida Yakub, Uzbekistan Initiative London, UK
6. Bakhrom Hamroev, , Society of Central Asian Migrants, Russia
7. Surat Ikramov, head of Initiative Group of Independent Right Defenders of Uzbekistan.
For further information and inquiries please contact:
Nigara Khidoyatova
Leader, Free Peasants Party
Address; Tashkent, Lashkarbegi street, 17, Uzbekistan
Tel: +998711322047/1375047
Email: odp2004@gmail.com
May 4th, 2007
Uzbekistan, isolated from the West since the Andijan massacre in May 2005, clearly regards the European Union as its best hope for rapprochement as a means to promote its interests within Europe. As a result of the German presidency of the Council of the EU, a delegation of EU experts led by Rolf Schulze, head of the Central Asia and Southern Caucasus Division of the German Foreign Ministry, led a working visit to Uzbekistan on March 31-April 4. They discussed questions arising from their last visit in December 2006, focusing on judicial proceedings involving individuals linked to the events in Andijan. Reportedly, both sides expressed their “mutual satisfaction” with the constructive dialogue in an atmosphere described as showing “mutual understanding” (Uzbek National News Agency, April 4).
In late March, the EU opened an information and documentation center in Tashkent, confirming the positive impression given to the EU by official statements. This center has been created in the spirit of the bilateral partnership and cooperation agreement between the EU and Uzbekistan. Located within the University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent, it is intended to facilitate the spread of information about the EU to lecturers, teachers, students, and government ministries. Although Uzbekistan is still subject to EU-imposed sanctions linked to Andijan, it wants to maximize the potential for improving its relations with the West through the EU.
Berlin remains the keystone for Tashkent’s efforts to eliminate EU opposition to the regime. On March 28 Rashid Qodirov, Uzbekistan’s prosecutor-general, received German Ambassador to Uzbekistan Matthias Meyer, offering briefings on the activities of the prosecutor’s office, its priorities, objectives, and bolstering a positive view of its role in protecting human rights.
They also considered practical aspects of deepening existing cooperation, based on an agreement between the two countries’ law-enforcement agencies signed in 1995, “On Cooperation in Fighting Organized Crimes, Terrorism, and Challenges Posing a Serious Threat to Society” (Huquq, Tashkent, April 5).
Indeed, there are signs of increased Uzbek diplomacy aimed at opening up greater contacts with Western multilateral bodies. Eson Mustafoyev, the head of Uzbekistan’s mission in NATO, presented his credentials to NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer on March 30. During the talks that followed, both sides explored the current state of Uzbek-NATO bilateral relations and prospects for the future (Xalq Sozi, Tashkent, April 3).
Since 2005 President Islam Karimov has looked beyond Russia for assistance, rejoined the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and entered a strategic partnership with Russia. He has also opened the largest and most attractive industrial facilities in Uzbekistan to Russian entrepreneurs.
The real winner from the Andijan legacy has been Rustam Inoyatov, head of the National Security Service (NSS). Inoyatov has witnessed a considerable strengthening of the NSS power base within Uzb